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Delusions are false beliefs that are held with strong
conviction despite the efforts of others to dissuade
the deluded individual. They are first-rank symptoms
of schizophrenia and feature prominently in numerous
other psychiatric and neurological conditions. Themati-
cally speaking, delusions range from the bizarre and ex-
otic (e.g.  I am the left foot of God) to the relatively
humdrum (e.g.  My neighbours are persecuting me).
Few delusions, however, have captured both the profes-
sional and public imaginations like the Capgras delusion,
which involves the belief that a spouse or close relative
has been replaced by a physically identical impostor.
Theories of the Capgras delusion tend to take the
form of either motivational or deficit accounts (McKay
et al., 2005a, b). Motivational formulations explain the
delusion in terms of some putative psychological ben-
efits it provides. For example, Enoch and Trethowan
(1991) claim that the delusion resolves ambivalent feel-
ings of love and hatred towards a loved one. In coming
to believe that the loved one is in fact an impostor, the
deluded individual can feel or express their unacceptable
feelings without guilt or tension.
Deficit accounts, on the other hand, view the Cap-
gras delusion as the consequence of a breakdown in the
normal functioning of belief mechanisms, underpinned
by neuroanatomical or neurophysiological abnormalities.
For example, Langdon and Coltheart (2000) explain
cases of Capgras delusion as resulting from the conjunc-
tion of two cognitive deficits. The first deficit involves
damage to neural pathways underpinning the emotional
component of face recognition (see Ellis et al., 1997).
The ensuing discordance between experiences of the way
someone  looks and the way they  feel is thought to
be what provides the content of the impostor delusion.
The second deficit is some kind of defect in the ma-
chinery of belief evaluation, and accounts for why the
impostor hypothesis, once generated, is then adopted
and maintained in the absence of appropriate evidence
for that hypothesis.
A recent model of the Capgras delusion integrates
both motivational and deficit perspectives (McKay et
al., 2005b; see also Raschka, 1981). This model posits
that the Capgras delusion may result when cognitive
or perceptual deficits interact with salient motivational
forces. For example, imagine a man who loves his wife
deeply, and is thus motivated to believe that they have
a happy and successful relationship. If such a man suf-
fers a neurological disruption to pathways subserving
the emotional component of face recognition, he may
be confronted with a combination of doxastic inputs (1.
This looks like my wife; 2. This doesn’t feel like my
wife) that, given his motivational state, is intensely dis-
turbing. In the face of these inputs, the inference that
there is something amiss in his relationship with his wife
may be the logical one to make. However, if he is suf-
ficiently motivated to avoid making this inference, he
may be attracted to an alternative that is less logical
yet in some sense still  fits the facts ( perhaps this
is not my wife after all, but rather a physically identical
impostor).
A possible means of testing this integrated explana-
tion of Capgras delusion, and of contrasting it with com-
peting accounts (i.e., purely motivational and deficit
theories), involves building a computational model of
the doxastic context in which Capgras delusions arise.
Such a model should abstract the clinical features of
typical Capgras cases, preserving only those factors con-
sidered relevant in delusion formation — namely, the
available perceptual information, the patient’s motives,
and the cognitive machinery underpinning belief dynam-
ics. By running computer simulations of this simplified
model, it should be possible to assess the relative impact
of each of these factors in the generation and mainte-
nance of the Capgras delusion.
A major difficulty in such research concerns the
choice of an appropriate formal architecture for repre-
senting belief dynamics. Most current approaches ei-
ther ignore (Gardenfors, 1988) or marginalize (Boutilier,
1998) the influence of motives in belief formation and
change, and hence are inadequate for critically assessing
the role of motivational factors in the formation of the
Capgras delusion (for a survey, see Paglieri, 2005). To
overcome this limitation, we make use of an alternative
approach to belief dynamics, Data-oriented Belief Revi-
sion (DBR). DBR was recently proposed by Paglieri and
Castelfranchi, and has been successfully used to model
motivational influences on belief formation and change
(Paglieri, 2005; Paglieri, Castelfranchi, 2005). DBR is
based on the ideas that (i) perceived information is be-
lieved or disbelieved on the basis of several specific prop-
erties, i.e. factual credibility, epistemic importance, mo-
tivational likeability and pragmatic relevance; moreover,
(ii) belief change should be understood as an emergent
effect of information dynamics, rather than being repre-
sented as an independent phenomenon as is customary
in standard approaches.
In framing Capgras delusion within the DBR model,
we will focus on two informational features: credibility
(the amount of supporting evidence) and likeability (the
motivational pressure exerted by the subject’s goals).
The relevant cognitive architecture will include 8 candi-
date data: 2 doxastic inputs (Dl: This agent looks like
my husband; D2: I feel uncomfortable with this agent),
3 potential conclusions (Cl: There is something wrong
with me; C2: There is something wrong with our rela-
tionship; C3: There is something wrong with the world,
i.e. my husband has been replaced by a physically iden-
tical impostor), and 3 inferential rules (II: [Dl & D2]→
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Cl; 12: [Dl & D2] → C2; 13: [Dl & D2] → C3). In
addition, we consider three motivational factors poten-
tially influencing the subject’s belief dynamics: Ml: I
want to be sane (= not Cl); M2: I want to have a good
relationship with my husband (= not C2); M3:1 want
the world to remain  as it should be (= not C3).
This computational setting allows us to manipulate
several different variables, in order to assess their rele-
vance for the development of the Capgras delusion: (i)
the amount of perceptual evidence regarding the phys-
ical appearance of the other person, i.e. the credibility
of node Dl; (ii) the strength of the feeling of uneasi-
ness, i.e. the credibility of node D2; (iii) the credibility
of the different inferential rules available to the agent,
i.e. nodes II, 12, and 13; (iv) the strength of the mo-
tivational influence exerted over different conclusions,
i.e. the likeability of nodes Cl, C2, and C3; and (v) the
weight assigned to different factors (i.e., credibility and
likeability) in the process of belief selection.
In this paper, we present the results of a series of
computer simulations of this model, to reproduce the
behaviour of both Capgras patients and ‘normal’ sub-
jects. More specifically, we wanted to test three com-
peting hypotheses regarding the cognitive genesis of the
Capgras delusion: whereas motivational theories assign
to factor (iv) the main role in the formation of the
delusion, deficit models emphasise the other variables.
In partial contrast with both, the theoretical synthesis
championed by McKay and colleagues (2005b) locates
the genesis of this syndrome in the interaction of all of
the variables.
Other authors (e.g. Sahdra, Thagard, 2003) have
used computational modelling techniques to successfully
simulate the effects of motivational factors on belief for-
mation in garden variety cases of self-deception. This is
the first reported effort, however, to model motivational
influences in the genesis of delusions. In future work,
we plan to extend this computational treatment to other
belief pathologies, e.g. the Reverse Othello Syndrome
(Butler, 2000), and cases of persecutory delusions in
hearing-impaired subjects (McKay et al., 2005a).
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THE RELATION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS’ PRIMARY LANGUAGE
AND THE NATURE OF THEIR SHORT-TERM MEMORY CODING
OF WRITTEN WORDS
Paul Miller
University of Haifa (Israel)
A first objective of the present study was to determine
the nature and efficiency of the strategy/ies used by
prelingually deafened, native signers and a hearing con-
trol for the temporal retention of written words. A sec-
ond objective was to reexamine the validity of the pri-
mary language coding hypothesis initially proposed by
Shand (1979) with reference to the obtained findings.
Data was gathered based upon a research paradigm ask-
ing the participants to remember series of six written,
consecutively presented words and to recognize them
